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Abstract
The mismatch between actions to combat climate change, which are based on voluntary national
initiatives of limited effort, and the recognition of the importance of global warming is growing. Climate
engineering via solar radiation management has been proposed as a possible complement to traditional
climate policies. However, climate engineering entails specific risks, including its governance. Free driving, the possibility of unilateral climate engineering to the detriment of other nations, has been recently
proposed as a potentially powerful additional externality to the traditional free riding one (Weitzman,
2015). This paper provides the first quantitative evaluation of the risks of free driving. Our results
indicate that in a strategic setting there is significant over-provision (by almost an order of magnitude)
of climate engineering above what is socially optimal, resulting in a sub-optimal global climate. Regions
with high climate change impacts, most notably India and developing Asia, deploy climate engineering
at the expenses of other regions.

Keywords: Climate Engineering, Climate governance, Free Driving, Climate Policy
JEL Classification: H41, Q54, Q58

Motivation
The slow progress in climate change abatement policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions is in
stark contrast with the estimated impacts of a warmer world. On the one hand, international climate policy
has produced little in terms of emission reductions. The Paris climate agreement has been rightly considered
an important step forward, due its wide coverage. But the treaty falls short of delivering the emissions cuts
needed to stabilize global climate at low temperatures (UNEP, 2010; Rogelj et al., 2015; Aldy et al., 2016).
Most importantly, the bottom up architecture is based on voluntary, nationally determined contributions
which are inefficient and remain hostage of the political variability, making the agreement particularly fragile.
This is in stark contrast with the increased long term ambition in terms of limiting global mean temperature
increase, which has been set by the agreement to well below 2°C, and in the direction of 1.5°C. Among
other things, one of the reason for the tight target is the increased recognition of the high impacts of climate
∗ The authors would like to thank Juan Moreno-Cruz, Martin Quaas, Elmar Kriegler, Martin Weitzman, Marco Casari, and
participants of the FEEM workshop on “Modeling Climate Engineering”, the SPP 1689 workshop on the 1.5°C Target and
Climate Engineering at Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the IEW 2016, Dublin, and the International Workshop on The
Economics of Climate Change and Sustainability 2017, Rimini for very valuable suggestions. The usual caveat applies.
† Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Centro-Euro Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC), Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano, Italy. E-Mail: johannes.emmerling@feem.it
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change on economic and ecological systems. Recent estimates suggest significantly higher impacts (Burke
et al., 2015), and emphasize non linear damages and tipping points (Lenton et al., 2008).
The observed discrepancy between what should be done and what is actually observed should not come
as a particular surprise. Economists and political scientists has since long warned about the difficulty of
establishing a climate agreement which is both effective and stable (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett,
1994). The main issue undermining the policy solution is the very essence of global warming, namely that
it is a global externality and that we lack the institutions required to govern it. This gap in action has
fueled the discussion about alternative policy options in order to cope with the impacts from climate change.
Among these, climate engineering (CE) refers to the deliberate and large-scale intervention in the Earth’s
climatic system with the aim of reducing global warming. One prominent climate engineering option, Solar
Radiation Management (SRM)1 , which counteracts the temperature increase by managing incoming solar
radiation, has become increasingly debated in recent years, see Bickel and Agrawal (2011),Gramstad and
Tjøtta (2010), Goes et al. (2011), Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2013), and Heutel et al. (2016).
Although the potential of SRM to substitute or complement mitigation measures has been mostly assessed in the global context, its impacts on the strategic incentives in the context of climate negotiations
are particularly relevant, as originally suggested by Schelling Schelling (1996). Climate engineering raises
specific governance issues(Victor et al., 2009).The important strategic feature of climate engineering has
been discussed in the fields of science, economics, law, and politics. VirgoeVirgoe (2008) discusses several
potential governance schemes to deal with the unilateral and non-cooperative incentives that can arise from
SRM. Overall, the strategic nature and regional heterogeneity provide strategic incentives for the use of
SRM.2 Therefore, the possibility of unilateral implementation needs to be considered (Rabitz, 2016).
Among the various governance issues, one argument has been recently put forward (Weitzman, 2015):
namely, that climate engineering is so relatively cheap (Barrett, 2008) that it might be deployed unilaterally
by one country to the detriment of others, due to side its effects or asymmetric impacts. Weitzman has
dubbed this new form of strategic interaction as ’free driving’. The familiar free riding externality which
is at the basis of the climate change dilemma is thus extended to the case of climate engineering: if free
riding leads to under-provision of emission reduction, free driving would lead to an over provision of climate
engineering above what would be the global social optimum. The challenges in governing both externalities
would be enormous, since they both suffer from the same lack of supra-national institutions. New governance
architectures can of course be envisaged and designed (Weitzman, 2015), but the current reality is that of
nation states acting in their own interest.
Given its relevance for climate policy, an assessment and comparison of this double externality is warranted. This paper aims at providing a first evaluation of the risk of free driving, vis-à-vis that of free
riding. In order to do so, we first lay out a conceptual framework for thinking about climate engineering
under non-cooperative and cooperative cases. Then, we use a calibrated energy-climate-economy model to
numerically quantify the free driving effect and to perform sensitivity analysis.

A game-theoretic framework
Given the strategic implications of climate engineering, it is useful to lay out a simple game theoretic model
to help framing the problem, before moving to the calibrated numerical analysis. Several dynamic games
1 For

simplicity, we will use CE and SRM interchangeably throughout the paper.
Rayner et al. (2013) suggested the so-called “Oxford principles” as a first guidance for governance and research on
CE by countries including its regulation as public good as first principle.
2 Indeed,

2

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1225

4

Emmerling and Tavoni: Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering

have been proposed in the literature. Ricke et. al.Ricke et al. (2013) provide a numerical assessment of
coalition formation in a two-stage game of coalition formation. Millard-BallMillard-Ball (2012) considers
the formation of a climate agreement about mitigation, with individual decision to implement CE. He
shows that a credible threat of unilateral geoengineering may strengthen global abatement and climate
cooperation. UrpelainenUrpelainen (2012) considers a simple two period deterministic model, showing that
the availability for CE in the future increases mitigation effort at present. Moreno-CruzMoreno-Cruz (2015)
also studies the dynamic nature of the SRM-Mitigation trade-off in a sequential two-stage game, and finds
that highly asymmetric impacts are an important driver of potential over-provision of CE. Manoussi and
XepapadeasManoussi and Xepapadeas (2015) study a differential game between two heterogeneous countries,
also finding countries with higher benefits/lower costs will engage more in using CE. Goeschl et. al.Goeschl
et al. (2013) analyze long-term inter generational trade-offs due to the possibility of CE, while Quaas et.
al.Quaas et al. (2017) consider the dynamics including the strategic decision on whether or not to engage
in research on SRM in the first place. Moreno-Cruz and SmuldersMoreno-Cruz and Smulders (2017) also
develop optimal and strategic CE facing impacts from temperature increase and carbon concentrations (using
a more complex carbon cycle) in an one-stage game, which is the most related to our approach.
Here, we follow BarretBarrett (2008) and Weitzman Weitzman (2015) and propose a static game-theoretic
model of optimal abatement and SRM policies. The strategy set is{ai , si } -abatement ai and climate engineering si indexed by region i = 1..N . We use a standard cost-benefit analysis approach, whereby each
country minimizes total costs from deployment of abatement and CE technologies, as well as impacts from
global warming and CE deployment.
For modeling the global climate, we use the carbon budget approach (Urpelainen, 2012; Matthews et al.,
2009) and express the global mean temperature change ∆T as a linear function of both total cumulative
emissions and SRM. Cumulative emissions are the sum of projected Business as usual (BAU) emissions
without any climate policy (ebau
j ) in region j over all regions N . SRM directly lowers global temperature,
proportionally to the global SRM deployment. We denote by γ the transient climate response (Matthews
et al., 2009) , that is the change in mean temperature due to cumulative carbon emissions, and by λ the
effectiveness of SRM to reduce temperature, so that global mean temperature increase is given by:3
N
N
X
X
bau
(ej − aj ) − λ
sj
∆T = γ
j=1

j=1

Each country i solves the problem of minimizing the total costs (T Ci ) from abatement, SRM deployment,
climate change impacts and SRM impacts given by:
T Ci = CAi (ai ) + CSi (si ) + DT i (γ

N
X

N
X

j=1

j=1

(ebau
− aj ) − λ
j

N
X

sj ) + DSi (

sj )

j=1

We can derive the first order conditions under both the Nash equilibrium and global optimum, as shown in
the Appendix for the case of a fully quadratic specification of costs and impacts. We focus on the symmetric
case of identical countries to show the differences between cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. More
general cases are discussed in the Appendix. Naming marginal damages from global temperature increase
3 Back
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T tC
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τ , mitigation costs α, impacts from SRM θ and SRM implementation costs σ, we find for each country the
optimal level of SRM under cooperation is

scoop
sym =

1/N
λ+

γ
λ



N 2 θ+σ
α
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N 2 θ+σ
γτ N 2

 γ

N
X



ebau
j

(1)

j=1

while in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium it is given by

sstrategic
=
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SRM deployment is driven by the efficacy to compensate global warming ( λγ ) and four terms comparing
costs and benefits -two of which depend on N . For N = 1, SRM deployment is the same under the strategic
and cooperative cases, and as expected there is no free driving. When N > 1, two effects drive a wedge
between the cooperative and strategic solution: the first term in the parenthesis in the denominator of (1)
and (2) represents the “free-driving effect” depending on the costs from SRM (implementation costsσ and
impacts θ) compared to mitigation costs (α). This term differs between cooperative and strategic solutions:
in the cooperative case, the impact of SRM in all regions are taken into account hence the factor N 2 instead
of N . This leads to a wedge in SRM deployment between strategic and cooperative cases, which grows in
N . The second term in the parenthesis basically compares both externalities, climate and SRM, and is of
second order compared to the first effect: since the climate externality scales in N both for climate impacts
and SRM impacts, here N cancels in the numerator and denominator, while only private SRM costs (σ) do
not scale in N . Thus, if N increases, the second term leads to higher SRM in the cooperative compared to
the strategic solution. Note however that this effect is linear in the marginal cost of SRM σ. That is, for
comparably small implementation costs compared to it potential impacts, i.e., σ  θ, this effect becomes
negligible and the free riding due to the first term effect dominates. Indeed, as discussed in the introduction,
the concept of free driving assumes that climate engineering costs are low, as it is believed to be case, see
Barrett (2008).
Figure (1) provides a graphical illustration of the free driving effect, measured by the ratio of SRM in the
strategic case over what socially optimal. Results are based on a calibration to given stylized facts (see the
Appendix for details) under different specification and for increasing number of countries. The picture shows
that when the costs of climate engineering are zero or sufficiently low, free driving grows almost linearly in
the number of regions, especially for N > 5. When climate engineering has no adverse impacts (θ = 0),
there is no free driving simply because SRM is fully deployed in both cooperative and strategic solutions.

Numerical quantification
The previous section has indicated that free driving grows in the number of countries. In order to quantitatively estimate the free driving effect, we need to move to a more realistic model. We employ a calibrated
energy-economy-climate model which optimizes investments in both climate engineering and mitigation in a
setting with strategic interactions among nations and no cooperation, and compare it to a benchmark case
with full cooperation, representing the world social optimum. The gap between these two climate architecture allows us to estimate free driving and free riding simultaneously. We use the game theoretic integrated
assessment model WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2009; Emmerling et al., 2016), a numerical model which has been

4
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Figure 1: Free driving effect (ratio of SRM deployment in strategic over cooperative) as a function of the number of
countries N .

extensively used to evaluate climate mitigation policies. The model integrates the energy sector into a dynamic optimal growth economic model, and runs for the whole century at five year time steps. WITCH
divides the world into 13 regions, and can represent both the non-cooperative Nash and the cooperative
Pareto solutions (see the Appendix for more details). Similarly to the analytical model, we use a cost benefit framework in which the cost of acting on climate change -either via mitigation or climate engineeringis weighted against the benefits of lowering global temperature. Climate change impacts are a quadratic
function of global temperature, with regionally differentiated and calibrated impacts Bosello and De Cian
(2014).
We expand the standard version of the model to include an SRM module, which accounts for operational
costs, effectiveness in compensating temperature as well as social and environmental impacts of climate
engineering. See the Appendix for the module description and calibration. The first two issues are relatively
well understood in the literature, and we use a linear cost function and proportional compensation of radiative
forcing to SRM. As for the external costs of SRM -which include possible damage to the ozone layer, side
effects of the implementation itself, as well as region-specific impacts such as increased droughts and other
eco-system impacts (Russell et al., 2012), these are currently unknown and profoundly uncertain. We assume
them to be global, and follow Goes et al. (2011), who suggest economic impacts of a fixed percentage of
consumption for a given amount of SRM. We provide boundary analysis via sensitivity scenarios. In addition,
in order to capture a specific consequence of SRM regarding the potential impact from abrupt warming
or cooling, which is not covered by standard damage functions, we assume a damage term coming from
temperature variation (as opposed to level) and calibrated on Lempert et al. (2000). We further assume that
SRM will be available from mid century onward, since SRM still needs to be further researched before being
deployed at scale.

5
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Figure 2: Cumulative mitigation (all greenhouse gases, 2010-2100) and SRM deployment for the cooperative and
strategic scenarios, with and without SRM.

Global free driving
The calibrated energy-climate model allows estimating free driving. To do so, we implement a two-by-two
scenario design with cooperation and strategic interaction as one dimension, and availability of SRM as the
other. This yields 4 scenarios, in addition to a counterfactual business as usual without climate change and
SRM. Figure 2 provides the main global results in terms of cumulative emission mitigation (left panel) and
SRM deployment (right panel). The left panel highlights a major decline in emission reduction when moving
from a cooperative setting to a non-cooperative one. This is the familiar issue of free riding, which limits
the incentives to reduce CO2 emissions when countries do not cooperate for the public good but rather
act in their own interest. Cumulatively over the century, free riding reduces mitigation by 85.4 and 82.9
for the cases with and without SRM respectively. When climate engineering is available (dashed lines),
we notice a reduction in mitigation, both in the case of cooperation and in the strategic non-cooperative
one. That is, we have evidence of SRM crowding out mitigation effort. This moral hazard effect has been
often described as one of the main rationale for banning SRM from the set of climate strategies (McLaren,
2016). Although our estimates indicate some substitution , quantitatively the mitigation crowd out is small
compared to the free riding effect (6.9% for the cooperative case, and 21.2% for the strategic case). The
right panel reports deployment of SRM in the scenarios where this is available. The chart provides evidence
of significant free driving: cumulatively over the second half of the century, SRM is over-provided by a factor
of 8 in the strategic case (19.1T gS) with the respect to the socially desirable level (2.4T gS). The almost one
order of magnitude free riding effect confirms the quasi linear predictions of the analytical model presented
in the previous section. Overall, the SRM over-provision appears to be of a similar magnitude than the
under-provision of GHG mitigation: that is, free riding and free driving are externalities of similar size.

Figure 3 shows the implications for global temperature increase.4 Without SRM, end of century temperature would increase by 2.8°C with cooperation and by 3.5°C without cooperation. That is, free riding -by
4 In

the appendix in Figure 12 we show the CO2 concentration.
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Figure 3: Global temperature over the 21st century (compared to preindustrial levels) across scenarios.

weakening mitigation efforts- increases end of century temperature by about 0.7°C, bringing it very close to
the BAU case of no climate damages. Availability of SRM allows to decrease temperature moderately under
cooperation (from 2.8°C to 2.4°C), but dramatically under non cooperation (from 3.5°C to 1.1°C). It is worth
noticing how globally sub-optimal this outcome is. In a world governed by supra-national institutions which
maximize global welfare by internalizing the impacts of SRM, SRM will be used to lower temperature only
late in the century and moderately, by less than 0.5°C. In a world characterized by national interests and no
coordination, SRM would be used excessively (2.4°C of cooling) and from the onset (year 2050).

Since deploying SRM generates global external costs, the over-provision of SRM documented in the
previous chart can negatively influence global welfare, outweighing the benefits of reduced global warming.
This is indeed what we show to be the case in Figure 4. Policy costs5 are higher in the strategic scenarios,
and increase when SRM is made available. On the contrary, cooperation lowers policy costs, and these are
not affected by whether SRM is there or not. The global economic losses from free-riding (2.8%-0.6%=2.2%)
further increase in the case of free driving (3.2%-0.6%=2.6%).
Decomposing the difference in policy costs between the runs with and without SRM over time, the lower
panel of Figure 4 shows that climate engineering external costs outweigh the benefits of lower temperature
throughout all the century. The gap between benefit of lower temperature and external damages of climate
engineering are much bigger for the strategic scenarios, which we as we have seen is characterized by a much
larger deployment of SRM. The other costs components appear to have only second order effects.
Regional distribution of climate engineering
So far we have looked at the global picture. Let’s now turn to the disaggregated regional results coming from
the integrated model, which divides the world into 13 macro-economic regions. Figure 5 reports the regional
distribution of SRM deployment. The cooperative scenario shows a low level of SRM–as documented before.
Moreover, given that we don’t consider equity weights between regions and the implementation costs of SRM
5

7
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Figure 4: Global welfare impacts of climate engineering. Upper panel: policy costs computed as GDP losses over the
BAU, aggregated over time as net present value (NPV) using a 3% discount rate.Lower panel: policy costs difference
between “with SRM” and “w/o SRM” scenarios decomposed by source and over time.
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Figure 5: Regional distribution of SRM. Cumulative (2050-2100) SRM deployment across regions for the cooperative
case (left bar), and the strategic cases with normal and high climate impacts (right and central bars). For the
definition of the regions, see Figure 8 in the Appendix.

are linear (see Appendix 6), the distribution between regions does not matter and the results presented here
prescribe an even split among regions. The most interesting results come from the non-cooperative cases,
which will be the focus of the regional analysis from here onward. Finding a unique solution to this problem
is not a trivial task, since multiple equilibria exist. In Appendix we discuss the approximation algorithm
which we use.
Results in Figure 5 indicate that SRM would be deployed in few regions, namely ’South (sasia)’ and
’South-East Asia (seasia)’, ’India’ and ’Sub-Saharan Africa (ssa)’, and to a minor extent in ’Middle East and
North Africa (mena)’. Results are confirmed when assuming that only one country at a time can deploy SRM
(see Figure 10 in the Appendix). The total SRM and its regional distribution appear to be relatively similar
when assuming higher climate change impacts, shown in the same chart. We also performed sensitivity
analysis with respect to the damages of SRM, which are highly uncertain -see Figure 11 in the Appendix.
Total SRM scales approximately linearly with the external impacts of SRM, in the expected direction of
lower impacts leading to more SRM. For low SRM damages, some additional tropical region -such as ’Latin
and Central America (laca)’- deploy it. Across all specifications, South Asian economies always deploy SRM.
Overall, SRM deployment is not very sensitive to its impacts: the upper and lower boundaries considered
differ from the central case by roughly 1 − 2 TgS/year, compared to the central estimate of 2 TgS/year.
The rationale for the regional distribution of SRM is shown in Figure 6. Developing Asia and Africa show
the highest climate benefits, in terms of reduced impacts from climate change. Indeed, these are the regions
which would suffer the most from climate change according to our climate impact function9.Abstracting
from the side effects of climate engineering, the global climate benefits of lowering temperature would be
substantial, from an expected economic loss in 2100 of around 14 trillion USD without SRM, down to 3
trillion with SRM. Of these almost 11 trillion USD in reduced climate impacts, 7.5 trillion USD would
accrue to the regions deploying SRM in Asia and Africa. Still, these countries would experience more than
half of the total residual climate damages. Moreover, lowering global temperature via SRM comes at the
cost of high impacts from SRM, shown in Figure 6 as a blue line.
To further delve into the strategic aspects of SRM, we evaluate which regions are gaining or losing
9
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Figure 6: Avoided climate impacts due to SRM and SRM impacts (in % of GDP NPV, 3% discount rate), as well as
SRM deployment (TgS per decade), for the strategic scenarios.
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from its availability. Figure 7 plots welfare and consumption losses both with and without SRM for the 13
regions. The diagonal line separates regions winning from SRM (above) from those loosing (below). The
chart indicates that the countries which do deploy SRM -in Asia and Africa- gain from doing so, at the
expenses of all other regions. However, total welfare (lower panel) is not significantly affected, and the
regions supporting SRM remain among the poorest in the world, both because of general economic factors
as well due to the higher impacts of climate change in these countries.

Conclusion
The analytical and numerical modeling exercises described in this paper document a significant risk of climate
engineering via free driving. When accounting for national strategic incentives, we find almost an order of
magnitude of over-provision of climate engineering above what socially optimal. Free driving on climate
engineering appears to be as significant as free riding on emission reductions. The regional results highlight
that the countries with higher expected impacts from climate change -India, South and Southeast Asia, and
to a lesser extent Africa- would be the ones deploying climate engineering at the expenses of the rest of
the World. Despite it, these poor countries would still host the majority of climate change impacts. These
results bear important repercussions for international climate policy. Climate engineering has been often
described as a possible solution in case climate negotiations over mitigation fail. Indeed, its cost effectiveness
in reducing global temperature and the ability to do so in rapid time is unparalleled. However, it is vital
that climate engineering is discussed and negotiated within the few existing supra-national institutions and
possibly jointly with mitigation measures. In such a setting, our model has shown that climate engineering
could provide a valuable complement to emission mitigation, lowering global temperature by 0.4°C. On the
other hand, failure to collectively manage climate engineering would results in free driving. This would lead
to too much SRM, and to a total welfare loss as the benefits from a less hot planet would be more than
offset by the damages inflicted by SRM deployment.
The underlying analysis is greatly simplified, especially for what concerns countries retaliatory measures
and political influence. For example, counteracting measures against SRM aimed at undoing the temperature
masking could be deployed, triggering an SRM war with unclear consequences. Although our results appear
to be robust to sensitivity analysis, more work needs to quantify the interplay between climate change and
SRM impacts. The latter are especially not well understood, and will require further research before they
can be robustly evaluated. But the governance challenges raised by climate engineering are enormous, and
should be guiding research and policy alike.
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Supplementary Information
Appendix A: Game-theoretic framework
As shown in the manuscript, each country i solves the program of minimizing the total costs T Ci given by
abatement costs, SRM costs, and impacts from global warming and SRM:
T Ci = CAi (ai ) + CSi (si ) + DT i (γ

N
N
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X
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We can derive the first order conditions under both the Nash equilibrium and global optimum. In the case
of the strategic Nash equilibrium, where the program consists in minsi ,ai T Ci , we have the following 2N
conditions:
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Each regions equalizes private marginal costs and benefits of abatement. For SRM, marginal total costs
(private implementation costs and private damages from implementation) are equalized with the marginal
benefits of reducing global warming, which depends on SRM climate effectiveness parameter λ.
PN
In the global cooperative settings, the optimization program consists in min{si ,ai } i=1 T Ci . In this
case, the standard Samuelson rule is obtained whereby marginal costs are equalized to total social marginal
benefits, namely:
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To compare both solutions, we consider a fully quadratic specification: CAi (ai )˙= 21 αa2i for abatement
costs, CSi (si ) ˙= 12 σs2i for implementation costs of SRM. We assume cost functions to be identical across
regions both to simplify notation, and since we focus on asymmetries on impacts or damages, where the
largest sources of regional variation exist. Impacts are represented by heterogeneous quadratic functions of
 P
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N
global mean temperature T . DT i (T ) = 12 τi γ j=1 (ebau
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for climate change impacts,
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and DSi (S) = 12 θi
for SRM impacts.
j=1 sj
Let’s first look at the cooperative solution, focusing on the optimal level of SRM. Straightforward solutions
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of the two sets of first-order conditions lead to6
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τj

where the term in square brackets measures the reduction in SRM due to costs and impacts from SRM
implementation. In the most optimistic case of a completely free and harmless SRM technology (σ = 0 and
θi = 0∀i), this term
SRM will be used to exactly offset the temperature increase caused by
 equals zero and
PN bau 
coop
1 γ
. Optimal SRM deployment is reduced due its implementation
baseline emissions si
=Nλ
j=1 ej
PN
cost σ, impacts in all countries θj , and the balance between benefits j=1 τj and costs α from abatement.
For instance, for zero abatement costs (α = 0), optimal SRM equals zero as full abatement of baseline
emissions is optimal. In the symmetric case (∀i : θi = θ, τi = τ ), SRM is the same across regions and the
solution simplifies to
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Let’s now look at the solution of strategic climate policy. We can solve for each country its optimal level
of abatement and SRM given the behavior of the others in terms of abatement ai and SRM sj6=i . Combining
both first-order conditions for one country, we find the optimal SRM level in the Nash solution equals to:
sstrategic
(sj6=i , aj6=i )
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which yields the reaction function of country i in terms of climate engineering. From this result, it can
already be seen that SRM across countries is a strategic substitutes since the reaction function decreases the
PN
amount of SRM implemented by the other countries j=1 sj6=i . Moreover, it is also decreasing in the amount
of abatement of the other players, implyingnthe abatement and o
SRM are also strategic substitutes. For the
strategic strategic
asymmetric case, the equilibrium solution
si
, ai
can be only computed numerically
i=1..N
considering the distribution of impacts from climate change and SRM implementation. As Barrett (2008)
already noted, the number of Nash equilibria is actually very large in this game. As before, we can simplify
the solution in the case of symmetric players.Using the reaction functions for SRM and abatement of all
players and solving for their intersection jointly, the symmetric (interior) Nash Equilibrium can be computed
as
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N
Without SRM costs and impacts, SRM will be deployed to fully undo the temperature increase: sstrategic
=
sym


γ PN
bau
. Costs and impacts from SRM lower its deployment. Now, also abatement costs and climate
j=1 ej
λ
impacts reduce SRM due to the interaction between both strategies.
Since we are interested in the free driving effect, it is worth comparing the SRM deployment in the
6 For SRM implementation, we theoretically need to add the non-negativity constraints thus the less or equal sign in the
solutions.
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strategic case vis à vis with the cooperative one. For the symmetric case, we can re-write both solutions (as
in the main text) as
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Barrett (2008).
Figure (1) shows the free driving effect measured by the excess SRM over what socially optimal, based on
a calibration of this simple model showing the ratio between strategic and cooperative SRM under different
specification and for increasing number of countries. We calibrate the model to broadly represent some
common projections about the 21st century: we assume base-line emissions of 6000 GtCO2, a transient
climate response of 1.5°C/T tC (Matthews et al., 2009), and effectiveness of SRM of −1.4°C/TgS based
on a radiative forcing effect of −1.75 m2W
T gS (Gramstad and Tjøtta, 2010) and a climate sensitivity value of
°C
0.8 W/m2 . We choose cost and damage parameters to represent some stylized facts, such as low cost of climate
engineering compared to abatement, and global temperatures values which are in line with the projections
of IAMs. In particular, the free parameters are set so that SRM costs are about 3-4 orders of magnitude
lower than abatement costs, and the cooperative solution results in a degree of global temperature increase
of 2.4 degrees compared with a value of 3.1 degrees for the non-cooperative case. The resulting values which
are used as central specifications for (1) are σ = 2, a = 0.0007 · 10−4 , θ=0.47, and τ = 37.5. Of course, this
is just an exemplifying specification with the aim to mimic the main orders of magnitude.

Appendix B: The numerical climate-energy-economy model
In this section we describe the implementation in the integrated assessment model (IAM) WITCH (Bosetti
et al., 2009; Emmerling et al., 2016) to assess the quantitative magnitude of the effect of climate engineering
on the optimal abatement path and a series of key variables of climate mitigation effort WITCH has been used
extensively in the literature of scenarios evaluating international climate policies, for example as a major contributor to scenarios reviewed by the IPCC in its fifth assessment report (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB).
WITCH is a global model with 13 macro-regions. It is a long-term dynamic model based on a Ramsey optimal growth economic engine, and a hard linked energy system which provides a compact but exhaustive
representation of the main abatement options both in the energy and non-energy sectors. The model is
solved numerically in GAMS/CONOPT. A description of the model equations can be found on the model
website at http://doc.witchmodel.org. In what follow we describe the key modules for this paper, namely
the climate impacts, the SRM and the solution algorithm.In terms of regional aggregation, the model regions
are depicted in Figure 8.

Climate Impacts
The standard damage function approach used in most IAMs including WITCH consists in a calibrated damage function, based on global temperature increase. Impacts from climate change include economic impacts
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Figure 8: WITCH model regions

of climate change due to sea-level rise, increased energy demand, and agricultural productivity impacts.
Moreover, non-market damages including ecosystem losses, non-market health impacts, and catastrophic
damages are taken into account. The estimated regional impacts are computed with a damage function
depending on global mean temperature T as
ΩTrt (T ) = a1r + a2r T + a3r T a4r

(9)

where {a1r , a2r , a3r , a4r } are calibrated region-specific coefficients, see Table 1 for the exact calibration values.
For the curvature, a quadratic function is used across regions, following e.g., Nordhaus (2014). Recently,
alternative specifications of climate impacts where temperature affects the rate of growth of the economy
have been proposed (Burke et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2012). In this paper we use the standard climate impact
formulation which is in line with the traditional body of evidence as reviewed by the IPCC. However, given
the uncertainties characterizing climate change damages we perform a robustness analysis on the exponent
of temperature, a4r . In the standard specification this is set equal to a4r = 2, in line with the quadratic
specification of the DICE modelNordhaus (2014). We perform a sensitivity analysis in the “high damage”
scenario, where the damage function is steeper with an exponent of a4r = 2.8, resulting in global impacts
from global warming (without adaptation) at 2.5°Cwarming by 2100 of 5.3% of GDP compared to 3.1% of
GDP in the baseline assumption.
The calibration is based on estimated impacts at the calibration of 2.5°Cwarming described in Bosello
and De Cian (2014). Figure 9 shows the impacts in per cent of GDP at the calibration point of 2.5°C across
the model regions. Impacts from climate as well as other damages (see below) are summed to a total impact
factor which is time and regional dependent: Ωrt = ΩTtn (T ) + ΩSRM
+ Ω∆T
tn
tn . This is applied multiplicatively
to consumption, thus reducing the level of well-being.
Cnet,rt =

Cgross,rt
1 + Ωrt

(10)
C

rt
Crt − 1+Ω
rt
Crt

That is, we can write the relative impacts as percentage of consumption RDrt defined as RDrt =
simplified as (1 − Ω1rt ), which for small values of Ωrt is approximately equivalent to RDrt ≈ Ωrtrt .7
7 This

follows from the approximation that

1
1+x

≈ 1 − x for x close to zero.
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region
usa
oldeuro
neweuro
kosau
cajaz
te
mena
ssa
sasia
china
easia
laca
india

a1r
0.0075
0.0094
0
0.0053
0.0078
0.0025
0
0
-0.0002
0.0041
0
0
-0.0002

a2r
0.0015
-0.0008
0.0052
-0.0008
0.0017
0.0004
0.0043
0.0102
0.0028
-0.0024
0.0033
0.0069
0.0042

a3r
0.0008
0.0019
0.0008
0.0014
0.0009
0.0018
0.0026
0.0034
0.0095
0.0018
0.0081
0.001
0.0096

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

a4r
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8
or 2.8

Table 1: Standard Climate Damages Parametrization in WITCH

Figure 9: Standard Climate Damages in WITCH for a 2.5°Cglobal mean temperature increase. Source: Bosello and
De Cian (2014).
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SRM has a unique characteristics among climate strategies in that it allows affecting global temperature
change in a direct and rapid way. In order to capture the potential impacts from abrupt warming or cooling,
which are not covered by standard damage functions, we add a damage component on temperature change
∆Tt = Tt − Tt−1 , based on Lempert et al. (2000). The authors estimate a quartic function leading to a one
percent consumption loss for a five-year warming (or cooling) of 0.35°C:
Ω∆T
tn = 0.01 ×



∆Tt
0.35

4
(11)

SRM Module
We model climate engineering as an option to reduce solar radiation through stratospheric aerosols. Specifically, we model million tons of sulfur (teragrams or TgS) injected into the stratosphere at the global scale
to lead to a negative radiative forcing of −1.75 m2W
T gS . This is a best guess estimate of Gramstad and Tjøtta
(2010), based on the range from −0.5 (Crutzen, 2006) to −2.5 (Rasch et al., 2008a). We assume a stratospheric residence time of two years, in line with the actual figure of a few years (Rasch et al., 2008b). Finally,
we assume a linear cost function at a cost of 10 billion $/TgS within the range considered in the literature,
between 5 (Crutzen, 2006) and 25 billion (Robock et al., 2009) USD per TgS.
The second important characteristics of SRM regard its side effects. SRM technologies bring about
substantial risks and potential side-effects such as ozone depletion, side effects of the implementation itself
(Robock et al., 2009; Tilmes et al., 2008), as well as region-specific impacts such as increased droughts
(Haywood et al., 2013). Moreover, SRM does not reduce the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Therefore,
damages from increased CO2 concentration such as ocean acidification are not mitigated, and, moreover, a
climate engineering policy cannot be suddenly discontinued as an abrupt temperature change would likely
occur (Brovkin et al., 2008; Irvine et al., 2012). These and other potential side-effects of CE are important
to take into consideration, see Robock (2008) and Klepper and Rickels (2014) for a recent overview. There is
very little evidence of the magnitude and distribution of SRM impacts (Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2013) For
our standard specification, we follow Goes et al. (2011), who suggest economic impacts of a fixed percentage of
consumption for an amount of SRM leading to offsetting a doubling of radiative forcing from CO2 emissions.
That is, the economic damages from SRM implementation equal to:
2

ΩSRM
t

=θ×

1.75 W/m
T gS
3.5

!α
×

X

SRMtn

(12)

n

where θ measures the percentage loss of consumption due to SRM. As their base value, the authors use a
linear impact function (α = 1), and use θ = 0.03 leading to three percent consumption loss for SRM leading
to −3.5W/m2 forcing. As a sensitivity analysis, we also consider the range the authors consider, namely
from zero up to five per cent (θ = 0.05) for impacts from SRM implementation. In all cases, we assume SRM
damages are global, but regionally equal.
Solution method: strategic and cooperative
At the strategic solution, each region n acts as one player maximizing its welfare. In this case, the set of
players consists each of a single of the 13 macro-regions which constitute the model. For each region n and
time period t, inter-temporal utility is computed as discounted sum of utility based on a utility function as
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W (n) =

X

l(t, n)

t

C(t,n)
l(t,n)

1−η

−1

1−η

βt.

Each player takes at this optimization
max

W (n)

IEN (t,n),ABAT (t,n),SRM (t,n)

the decisions of the other regions into account, which mainly consist in mitigation (through investment
in different energy technologies, abatement of land-use emissions, and non-CO2 gases), and SRM deployment {IEN (t, j 6= n), ABAT (t, j 6= n), SRM (t, j 6= n)}. In order to find the open-loop Nash equilibrium,
we employ an iterative algorithm in which each regions optimizes independently, and global values such
as temperature are computed after each iteration. This algorithm has been shown to be robust to initial
specifications, see (Bosetti et al., 2009; Emmerling et al., 2016).
Since SRM affects global variables such as temperature, and since it creates a global externality of its
own, its inclusion in the model makes obtaining a numerical solution for the equilibrium in the strategic
case significantly more complicated. In particular, for high deployment of SRM, temperatures can become
negative, violating some of the climate module equations. Moreover, as Barrett (2008) noted, many Nash
equilibria can exist in the strategic SRM-abatement setting.
In order to find the candidate solution for the strategic setting, we used an approximation method based
on two steps. First, we run the model only allowing unilateral SRM of one region at a time, that is, solving the
allocations given {IEN (t, j 6= n), ABAT (t, j 6= n), SRM (t, j 6= n) = 0}. The results from the unilateral SRM
runs are reported in the next section, and we use them as boundary conditions for the strategic equilibrium
results. In particular, we restrict SRM in each region by a maximum percentage of their unilaterally chosen
level of SRM (at each point in time) such that the climate module was still able to calculate global mean
temperature based on all radiative forcing. We subsequently checked that all SRM implementations across
time and regions actually fell strictly within the provided boundaries, to ensure an interior solution was
found. We experimented with different percentage limitations, and set them to be between 15% and 30 for
the different SRM impact specifications.
In the cooperative solution on the other hand, the grand coalition of all regions maximizes a sum of
the welfare of the member regions W coop . While there are several welfare concepts admissible to aggregate
welfare across coalition members, we consider an equal marginal utility of consumption resembling the Negishi
solution to avoid re-distributional concerns entering the optimal climate policy question. That is, welfare in
this case is computed as

!
W coop =

X X
t

l(t, n)

n

1−η
P
Pn C(t,n)
−1
n

l(t,n)

1−η

βt

using the same intertemporal fluctuation aversion of η = 1.5 as in the Nash case. This solution is a spacial
case of a disentangled Utilitarian solution, disregarding account inequality across regions, see Emmerling
et al. (2016) or more details.
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Appendix C: Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 10: Unilateral SRM implementation (average per year SRM over the period 2050-2100) for different SRM
impact specifications (θ = 0.01; 0.03; 0.05).
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Figure 11: SRM implementation in the strategic case for different damages from SRM. The central bar shows the
reference case of θ = 3%.

Appendix D: Additional Figures

Figure 12: Global atmospheric CO2 concentration over the 21st century across scenarios.
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